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Kwangduk Langgeng was an apparel factory located in the Kawasan Berikat Nusantara (KBN) 
export processing zone in Cakung, Jakarta, Indonesia. Kwangduk Langgeng, formerly named 
Kolon Langgeng, was the subject of a compliance assessment by the WRC in 2003, which 
resulted in substantial improvements to its employees’ working conditions.  
 
However, after several of the factory’s customers, including Nike, ceased placing orders with the 
company, Kolon Langgeng’s business declined, and the factory ultimately closed at the end of 
2009. This update discusses labor rights issues related to the factory’s closure.  
 
Kolon Langgeng was owned by Kolon International Corporation, a multinational industrial 
conglomerate based in Seoul, South Korea. According to factory disclosure data provided to 
WRC affiliate universities, Kolon Langgeng produced collegiate licensed apparel for Nike from 
2000 to 2003. During this period, Kolon Langgeng also supplied several other U.S. buyers, 
including Tom Taylor, DKNY, Anne Klein, Liz Claiborne and Anne Taylor.  
 
By 2006, all these buyers had ceased placing orders with Kolon Langgeng except Tom Taylor. 
Although Nike, by then, had stopped purchasing garments directly from Kolon Langgeng, the 
factory continued to make Nike apparel via subcontracts from nearby factories.  
 
In 2007, the company acquired new management and changed its name to Kwangduk Langgeng. 
The factory also began supplying three new buyers – German retailer s.Oliver, the Hong Kong-
based Li & Fung Group and J.C. Penney. By the time of the factory’s closure in 2009, J.C. 
Penney, s.Oliver and the Spanish apparel firm, Inditex, were the factory’s only customers.  
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II. The Closure of Kwangduk Langgeng 
 
1. Factory Converts Workers to Short Term Contracts, Pressures to Waive Severance Benefits 
 
In September 2009, workers at Kwangduk Langgeng began to return to the factory after the Idul 
Fitri holiday. Due to a lack of orders at the factory, workers had been granted extended leaves 
and were returning on a staggered schedule with the last employees due back at the factory in 
mid-October. Immediately after the holiday, factory management announced to returning 
workers that the company planned to layoff regular employees and replace them with short-term 
contract workers and day laborers. The management claimed that there were insufficient orders 
to employ the existing workforce.  
 
Employing workers who are part of a factory’s regular labor force on short-term contracts 
violates Indonesian law.
1
 When employee union representatives protested this move by the 
company, they were threatened with dismissal. Moreover, instead of negotiating with the 
employees’ union concerning the situation, managers instead met with workers in small groups 
and attempted to pressure them to sign severance agreements.  
 
By early October, roughly thirty of the factory’s remaining 500 workers had signed such 
agreements. The amount offered to employees for severance benefits was reportedly 3,300,000 
Rupiah, somewhat less than the legal minimum amount due if the company were to be legally 
declared bankrupt. However, this amount constituted less than half of what workers ordinarily 




2. Factory Locks Out 300 Workers Including Entire Union Membership, Leadership 
 
On October 8, 2009, the situation worsened as Kwangduk Langgeng proceeded to lockout its 
employees who were union members.
3
 The lockout violated Indonesian labor laws which require 
seven days notice to workers before an employer can lock them out of the workplace.
4
 In a 
further violation of Indonesian law and international labor standards, Kwangduk Langgeng hired 
new employees to replace the locked-out workers.
5
 
                                                        
1
 See, President of Republic of Indonesia Act 13 of 2003 Concerning Manpower (“Act 13 of 2003”), § 59 (2) (“[A] 
work agreement for a specified time cannot be made for jobs that are permanent by nature.”). 
2 See, id. at §156, §164 (3), and §165 
3
 See, id. at §1 (24) (“[A] lockout is the entrepreneur’s action of refusing the worker/labourer in whole or in part to 
perform work.). 
4
 See, id. at §148 (1) (“[A]n entrepreneur who intends to perform a lockout is under an obligation to give a written 
notification of the lockout to workers/ labourers and/or trade/ labour union and the local government agency 
responsible for manpower affairs of no less than 7 (seven) workdays before the lockout takes place.”). 
5
 See, id. at § 144 (1a) (“[I]n the event of a strike performed pursuant to Article 140, the entrepreneur is prohibited 
from […] [r]eplacing striking workers/labourers with other workers/labourers from outside of the enterprise.”); ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association (“ILO CFA”), Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of 
Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO ¶ 632 (2006) (“The hiring of workers to break a strike in a 
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Despite this illegal conduct by the factory’s management, the employees’ union still pursued 
negotiations with the company. The labor-management dispute was further exacerbated, 
however, by the company’s varying statements to employees regarding its future prospects, 
which alternated among telling employees that the company needed to convert its workforce to 
short-term contracts in order to survive, informing them that the factory would be operated for 
two months at reduced capacity to see if it was viable, and saying that the firm shortly would be 
declaring bankruptcy.  
 
On October 12, the factory’s management gave the workers formal notice that the factory was 
conducting selective layoffs, and that all remaining employees would be converted to short-term 
contract workers. The employees, in turn, called for further negotiations to keep the factory open, 
and that if a reduction in the workforce was necessary, its terms should be negotiated in good 
faith with the union, and the affected workers should be paid the full amount of legally-due 
severance benefits.  
 
By October 14, all of the employees had returned from the Idul Fitri holiday. At this point, only 
127 employees, out of the 500 who had been at the factory prior to the holiday, were working at 
the plant. Significantly, all the employees who had been kept on at the factory were those whose 
employment agreements had been converted to short-term contracts. The company had locked 
out the remaining nearly 375 workers, among them the entire governing board and membership 
of the employees’ union. Additionally, the company denied the employees’ union access to its 
in-plant office.  
 
By this time the WRC had contacted the factory’s management and its three remaining buyers – 
Inditex, s.Oliver and J.C. Penney. The factory’s management denied that the company had 
locked out the workers, and proceeded to explain that the company faced serious economic 
problems and did not have sufficient orders to keep the entire workforce employed. The factory’s 
management stated that in order to survive, the company was laying off 300 out of its 500 
employees, and that if Kwangduk Langgeng filed for bankruptcy, it might not have any funds to 
pay severance benefits to the workers.  
 
In response to requests from the WRC, all three buyers took steps to intervene. On October 15, 
J.C. Penney and s.Oliver sent representatives to meet with the company’s management and urged 
the company to comply with Indonesian law and international standards.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
sector which cannot be regarded as an essential sector in the strict sense of the term, and hence one in which strikes 
might be forbidden, constitutes a serious violation of freedom of association . . . .”). 
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S.Oliver reported to the WRC that the company was not receiving any new orders and seemed to 
be on the brink of bankruptcy. S.Oliver also indicated that Kwangduk Langgeng’s management 
had abandoned its attempt to keep the factory open by converting its workers to short-term 
contracts and was beginning the process of filing for bankruptcy. Accordingly, s.Oliver informed 
the WRC that its representatives had insisted that the factory management pay severance benefits 
to employees in accordance with Indonesian law.  
 
3. Company Files for Bankruptcy, Blacklists Union Leaders 
 
From October 17, 2009 onwards, the factory management maintained the position that it was 
closing on account of bankruptcy, however, despite several requests from the WRC, Kwangduk 
Langgeng did not produce any documentation in support of this claim. Raising further doubts 
regarding the company’s intentions, employees reported that the factory was expanding its 
parking garage, was still manufacturing garments for Inditex’s Zara retail division, and was 
hiring new contract workers.  
 
Of more serious concern to the WRC, the factory management reportedly had called in 
paramilitaries and preman -- an Indonesian term for local gangsters and thugs who are often 
hired by companies during labor disputes -- to intimidate locked-out workers who were picketing 
outside the factory. In response, the employees’ union complained of the management’s conduct 
to local police intelligence officials, who then threatened the factory’s expatriate manager with 
deportation.  
 
After this escalation, the management and the workers’ union reinitiated negotiations with a 
focus on reaching an agreement on severance benefits. The factory management promised to 
make a revised severance offer to the union, and a resolution to the dispute appeared near.  
 
Unfortunately, the revised offer from the company never materialized and, instead, the situation 
further deteriorated. At the end of November, the WRC learned that Kwangduk Langgeng had, 
through its personnel manager, distributed a blacklist of all its employees who were leaders in 
the workers’ union throughout the KBN industrial zone where the factory was located. The 
blacklist contained photos of the union’s entire governing board. Issuing blacklists constitutes a 




When re-contacted by the WRC, s.Oliver, Inditex and J.C. Penney all stated that they had very 
little leverage over Kwangduk Langgeng’s management, as they were not placing any new 
orders at the factory since the company had explained that it was going into bankruptcy. 
 
                                                        
6
 See, ILO CFA, supra, n. 5 at ¶ 803 (“All practices involving the blacklisting of trade union officials or members 
constitute a serious threat to the free exercise of trade union rights . . . .”). 
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4. WRC Arranges Settlement Talks Between Factory and Workers’ Union 
 
In December, the WRC received information that the company’s former owner, with whom the 
WRC previously had extensive prior dealings, was still involved in Kwangduk Langgeng’s 
business decisions. On December 22, 2009, the WRC contacted the former owner and sought his 
personal involvement to end the stalemate between the workers and the management.  
 
To his credit, the former owner responded immediately and committed to meet with the leaders 
of the union representing the workers. The former owner also confirmed to the WRC that the 
company was filing for bankruptcy.  
 
On December 29 and 31, 2009, the former owner met with the union and reached a final 
settlement, whereby the workers would get 1.25 times the severance benefits normally payable 
when an employer is bankrupt.
7
 The owner also agreed to withdraw the blacklist of the union’s 
leaders. The owner sent the agreement to the WRC on December 31, 2009. On January 3, 2010, 
the WRC confirmed the company’s implementation of the agreement through interviews with the 




The closure of Kwangduk Langgeng represents a setback for university code of conduct 
enforcement, as it presents yet another case where a factory, for several years, made good faith 
efforts to comply with university and buyer codes of conduct, yet experienced a continuing loss 
of orders from buyers. As in similar cases, such as those of the former BJ&B plant in the 
Dominican Republic and Lian Thai Garment in Thailand, successful remediation of violations of 
university codes of conduct was followed, soon after, by university licensees discontinuing their 
orders with the factory. The apparent readiness of many leading university licensees to cease 
doing business with factories that have chosen to respect workers rights – whether because of 
increases in production costs associated with labor rights compliance or on other grounds – 
remains one the most troubling obstacles faced by the WRC in its efforts to reform purchasing 
practices in the collegiate licensed apparel industry. 
 
 
                                                        
7
 As previously noted, according to Indonesian law, workers are entitled to twice the severance benefits if their 
employer is not bankrupt as they would be owed if it were. See, Act 13 of 2003, supra, n. 2. Whether or not 1.25 
times the severance benefit owed in case of bankruptcy meets the legal standard depends on whether Kwangduk 
Langgeng was truly bankrupt at the time workers’ employment was terminated. As due to lack of convincing 
evidence in either direction, the WRC was not able to reach a finding on this question before the settlement between 
the union and the company was reached, the question remains unanswered.  
8 According to workers, a company called PT BTS opened in July 2010 on the site of Kwangduk Langgeng. 
However, there appears to be no relationship between PT BTS and Kwangduk Langgeng. 
